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This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in innovation 
policy using European data on obstacles to innovation. We propose a discrete test of 
supermodularity in innovation policy leading to a number of inequality constraints. We 
apply our test to two types of innovation decisions: to innovate or not, and if so, by how 
much. We find that the evidence regarding the existence of complementarity in 
innovation policies depends on the phase of innovation that is targeted  (getting firms 
innovative or increasing their innovation intensity) as well as on the particular pair of 
policies that is being considered. The two phases of the innovation process, i.e. the 
probability of becoming an innovator and the intensity of innovation, are subject to 
different constraints.  Interestingly, there seems to be a need to adopt a package of 
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policies to make firms innovate, while a more targeted choice among policies is 
necessary to make them more innovative.  
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1. Introduction 
The question as to whether policy variables are interrelated is important.  Changing one 
policy variable may have little effect if other policy variables remain unchanged.   
Understanding these interlinkages is central for policy makers in order to achieve the 
desired objectives.  In this context, this paper asks a simple question, namely to what 
extent there is empirical evidence for complementarities in some innovation policy
1.  In 
answering this question we develop a framework for testing complementarities in a 
discrete setting and apply it to a data set on European firms. 
A group of activities is complementary if doing more of any subset of them increases 
the returns from doing more of any subset of the remaining activities.  In a standard 
(differentiable) framework, complementarity between a set of variables means that the 
marginal returns to one variable increases in the level of any other variable, or more 
formally that the cross-partial derivatives of the payoff function are positive.  However, 
complementarity can also be present when the decision variables are discrete.  The 
notion of complementarities per se requires only that some order relation be put on the 
objects under consideration. This observation has lead to the actual formalization of the 
concept within the mathematical theory of lattices, which is the basis for the 
development of monotone optimization problems pioneered by Arthur Veinott and 
Donald Topkis (see, for instance, Topkis (1978)).   
The formalization of complementarities to discrete structures permits the analysis of 
such complex and discrete entities as organizational structures, institutions, and 
government policies.  It provides a way to capture the intuitive ideas of synergies and 
systems effects, i.e. that "the whole is more than the sum of its parts."  Furthermore, it 
constitutes the starting point for an understanding of the failure of piecemeal approaches 
to policy: if elements of a given organization are complementary, then adopting only 
                                                 
1 We do not consider all potentially relevant innovation policies. Still, the analysis is valid as it is possible to 
study complementarities amongst a subset of variables regardless of whether the objective function is 
supermodular on the remaining variables or not.     4  
   
some of the features of a better performing organization may not yield as good a 
performance as if all features are adopted. 
The study of complementarity has since been introduced into economics.  The first full-
fledged application in economics to the optimization in complementary problems and 
oligopoly problems is by Xavier Vives 1990
2.  There have been many subsequent 
contributions; like the work by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990)).  For a recent 
reference on the theory of supermodularity and complementarity, as well as a 
comprehensive reference list, the interested reader is referred to Topkis (1998).  
A prominent arena where such interlinkages are frequently claimed is in the study of 
innovation, which is the topic of this paper.  It is often argued that innovation is a 
complex outcome, influenced by many factors that are interrelated.  Moreover, an 
innovation system is often said to have discrete characteristics encompassing a set of 
institutions, laws, incentives, and customs.  More importantly, the interrelatedness of 
those factors is often described as one that is complementary, i.e. the factors act together 
and reinforce each other (Dosi, 1988).  A consequence of this is that piecemeal policy 
may not be successful, as one-dimensional policy prescriptions in isolation will not 
produce the desired outcomes.   
This paper develops a framework for testing complementarities in innovation policy. 
Our approach is based on governments choosing a set of parameters (policies) at the 
national level in order to maximize innovation activities. Within this framework we ask 
whether policy decisions are complementary. If so, policy actions would tend to occur 
together in order to maximize the impact on innovation activities.   
                                                 
2 The paper was first published in 1985, as a CARESS working paper at the University of Pennsylvania.     5  
   
Testing for complementarity can be achieved in a number of different ways (for a 
thorough overview of these different approaches see Athey and Stern (1998))
3.  One 
approach is based on revealed preferences, assuming optimization behavior.  Given the 
complementarity in the choice variables (in our case the government￿s policies), they 
would tend to be correlated.  Using the ￿correlation approach￿ one can start by 
computing simple correlations, which would not control for any other characteristics.  
More sophisticated analysis would entail controlling for other factors (observed and 
unobserved) as well as deriving explicit first-order conditions (see, for instance, Arora 
and Gambardella (1990), Ichniowski et al. (1997), or Miravete and Pern￿as (2000)). 
Note that this approach requires availability of the choice variables, but no data on the 
objective.   
A second approach, the so-called reduced form approach, is based on exclusion 
restrictions (see, for instance, Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1994)).  The idea is that a 
factor that has an effect on one action will not be correlated with another action unless 
the actions are complementary. As noted by Arora (1996) this approach is unable to 
disentangle interactions between more than two variables.   
The final approach is the one taken in this paper
4. We consider the objective function 
directly, in our case the innovation function. Recall that whenever actions are 
complementary then the innovation function is supermodular.  The direct way of testing 
for complementarity is thus to investigate whether the innovation function is 
supermodular in the policy action (see also Ichniowski et al. (1997)). Consequently, we 
                                                 
3 They show that unobservable heterogeneity can introduce a bias into the estimation of complementarity.  
Having cross-sectional data, our analysis only controls for observed heterogeneity through exogenous 
control variables (see below). To the extent that there are omitted variables, which are correlated with 
others, a bias in the estimates does occur. However, this does not automatically imply that 
complementarity will be inconsistently estimated. To see this, consider the following simple model: 
ε β β β β + + + + = 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 x x x x y . Complementarity exists whenever  0 3 > β , which implies that we need a 
consistent estimate of  3 β .  Suppose that the omitted variable is correlated with  1 x , such that 
0 ) , ( plim 1 ≠ ε x . In this case  1 β  is inconsistently estimated by OLS.  However,  3 β  may still be consistently 
estimated, unless we also have that  0 ) , ( plim 2 1 ≠ ε x x . That is despite the correlation between the omitted 
variable and the included variables, complementarity can still be consistently estimated, unless the 
omitted variable is correlated with the interaction of  2 1x x .  
4 Another recent paper using this approach is Cassiman and Veugelers (2002).  However, they estimate 
complementarity between two innovation activities only (internal R&D and external technology 
acquisition).  By contrast, our approach allows for multiple dimensions.     6  
   
directly estimate the innovation function and develop tests for both super- and 
submodularity.  
We apply our test to a data set on European firms and consider four types of obstacles to 
innovation that are affected by policies: (i) lack of appropriate sources of finance, (ii) 
lack of skilled personnel, (iii) lack of opportunities for cooperation with other firms and 
technological institutions, and (iv) legislation, norms regulation, standards, and taxation.   
For two reasons, we like to differentiate between two phases of the innovation process: 
the decision to innovate or not and the intensity of innovation conditional on doing any 
innovation at all. The first reason for considering the two innovation decisions 
separately is an empirical one. We only observe innovation activities, conditional on 
doing any innovation at all.  In other words, we may have a censoring problem.  In 
order to control for possible censoring biases we estimate a generalized Tobit model.  
The second reason is that the complementarities may differ substantially across the two 
phases of innovation. Policy impacts as well as complementarity in policy may be rather 
different for the intensity of innovation, as compared to the likelihood of becoming an 
innovator.   
We find that the evidence regarding the existence of complementarity in obstacles 
depends on the phase of the innovation process (decision to innovate and intensity of 
innovation) as well as the particular pair of policies.  While the evidence regarding the 
propensity to innovate points towards a number of substitutable relationships, 
complementarity exists for a number of obstacles as far as the intensity of innovation is 
concerned.  This points towards a possible difficulty in designing optimal policies for 
innovation, since the impact may pan out very differently across innovation activities. 
Interestingly, there seems to be a need to adopt a package of policies to make firms 
innovate (propensity to innovate), while a more targeted choice among policies is 
necessary to make them more innovative (intensity of innovation).  
    7  
   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the framework, while Section 3 
defines supermodularity in innovation. Section 4 specifies the test and section 5 
discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A Framework for Innovation Policy 
In this section we present a framework in which complementarity in innovation policy 
can be identified.  We begin by assuming that innovation is affected by K national 
policy variables chosen by governments denoted by  ) ,...., , ( 2 1 Kj j j j a a a a = , where j is the 
country.  Innovation occurs in each country and is characterized by the innovation 
function  ) , ( ij j a I θ , where  ij θ  are country and industry-specific pre-determined factors.  
The problem of the government is to choose a set of national policies  ) ,...., , ( 2 1 Kj j j j a a a a =  
that maximize innovation, i.e.  ) , ( max ij j a a I
j
θ .   
Even though the maximization problem is analogous for all countries, this does not 
imply that all countries will choose the same set of policies, due to the country and 
industry-specific factors  ij θ .  For instance, countries or industries might differ because 
of their institutional endowments.  According to North (1994, page 360):  
￿Given that these institutions are likely to be different across countries and 
industries, such as institutions, laws, incentives, customs, etc., they will 
translate into country-specific and firm-specific heterogeneity, which in turn 
may lead to different outcomes.￿   
These pre-determined factors  ij θ  thus represent institutions, history, customs, norms, 
technologies, etc. and are responsible for different national policy choices. 
Using the direct approach, complementary in government actions can in principle be 
tested by asking whether  ) , ( ij j a I θ  is supermodular in  j a,  assuming that data on 
government actions are available. Unfortunately, the available data on innovation do not 
report government actions.  Instead, we have a number of measures of the obstacles to    8  
   
innovation.  To the extent that the relationship between actions and obstacles is 
monotone, we are able to measure complementarity in actions through data on 
obstacles.  Accordingly, we define  kj kj a C − = , where Ckj,, ( k=1,￿,K),  denote the 
innovation obstacles faced by firms in country j.  We then write the innovation function 
as,  
) , ,...., , ( ) , ( 2 1 ij Kj j j ij j C C C f C I θ θ =        [ 1 ]  
and test whether [1] is supermodular in the obstacles.  
 
3. Supermodularity of the Innovation Function 
 
Since obstacles are discrete variables, one cannot introduce interaction terms in the 
regression framework and test for the sign of the interaction parameters.  Instead we 
need to derive a set of inequality constraints as implied by the theory of 
supermodularity and test whether the constraints are accepted by the data. 
Let the innovation function be given by [1], where the obstacle set C ( C C j ∈ ) is a set of 
elements that form a lattice and the θ ￿s are pre-determined parameters.  We define 
complementarity of the innovation function as follows (see for example Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990, page 516). 
Definition: Let  j C′ and  j C′ ′  be two elements in the obstacle set.  Then the industry 
innovation function  ) , ( ij j C I θ  is supermodular if and only if 
) , " ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ij j j ij j j ij j ij j C C I C C I C I C I θ θ θ θ ∧ ′ + ′ ′ ∨ ′ ≤ ′ ′ + ′ . 
A useful result for the empirical analysis below is that it suffices to check pairwise 
complementarities in case there are more dimensions than two in the lattice (Topkis, 
1978).  In other words, a function is supermodular over a subset of its arguments, if and 
only if all pairwise components in the subset satisfy the above definition.    9  
   
A Simple Example: 
A simple example might be useful for illustrative purposes
5.  Suppose there are 
two binary decision variables, which implies that the set C consists of four 
elements  {} {} {} {} {} 11 , 10 01 , 00 = C .  For example, a country may adopt flexible labor 
markets and a market-based financial system (corresponding to  00
1 = j C ) or 
choose less flexible labor markets and less market-based finance (corresponding 
to  {} 11
4 = j C ), as well as the mixed cases.  Using the above definition of 
supermodularity implies that there is only one nontrivial inequality constrain 
() () () 11 00 ) 01 ( 10 I I I I + ≤ +  or equivalently  ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 11 ) 00 ( 10 I I I I − ≤ − . The intuition 
from the last inequality is that increasing the first activity is more effective when 
the second activity is high. In other words, the impact of less flexible labor 
markets is higher whenever we have less market-based finance. Or alternatively, 
more flexible labor markets are effective whenever finance is market-based.  
Note that the above example ignores the institutional endowments ( ij θ ).  Whenever the 
institutional endowment is the same for two countries, it follows that the countries will 
optimize by choosing the same actions.  In the example above this would imply that 
countries with identical θ ￿s either choose { } 00  or { } 11  whenever the innovation function 
is supermodular.  Thus, the only source of variation in the observed outcomes stems 
from differences in θ . This has been formalized by Milgrom and Shannon (1994), who 
show that the comparative statics on the maximizers  ( ) θ
*
j C  are unambiguous, whenever 
) , ( ij j C I θ  is supermodular with respect to the lattice C.  In other words, the set of choice 
variables in C are complementary, moving up or down together in a systematic, 
coherent fashion, depending on the institutional endowments  ij θ . 
We now derive the inequality constraints that need to be satisfied for the industry 
innovation function to be supermodular.  Let the K obstacles to innovation be binary, i.e. 
they take on the value of either 1 (high) or 0 (low).  Define an element of the set C 
( C C j ∈ ) as a string of K binary digits, where the individual binary components of each    10  
   
element of the set C represent the obstacles to innovation.  Thus, there are 
K 2  elements 
in C.  In terms of our data set below we have chosen 4 obstacles, which implies that 
K=4.  The elements in C are therefore (0000), (0001), (0010),￿￿,(1111), a total of 16 
elements.  Define the ordering of the elements in the set C as the component-wise order 
under the ￿max￿ operation.  This implies that the set C is a lattice.  Finally, define the 
innovation function [1] over the set C.   
Using the definition of supermodularity, and the fact that we only need to check pair-
wise elements, it can be shown that the number of nontrivial
6 inequality constraints 










K i , where K is the number 
of obstacles and i=2 (binary).  Since K=4, we have a total of 24 nontrivial inequality 
constraints.   
In particular, using the above definition of supermodularity we can write the 4 
nontrivial inequality constraints for obstacle 1 and 2 to be complementary in innovation 
as, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ij ij ij ij XX I XX I XX I XX I θ θ θ θ , 11 , 00 ) , 01 (   , 10 + ≤ + ,      [2] 
where  {} 11 , 10 , 01 , 00 = XX .  Similarly, the 4 nontrivial inequalities necessary to hold for 
obstacles 1 and 3 to be complementary are, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ij ij ij ij X X I X X I X X I X X I θ θ θ θ , 1 1 , 0 0 ) , 1 0 (   , 0 1 + ≤ + , 
where  {} 11 , 10 , 01 , 00 = XX  again.  The remaining 16 constraints corresponding to 
complementarity between obstacles 1 and 4, 2 and 3, 2 and 4, and 3 and 4 are 
analogous.  Complementarity over all actions is given, whenever all the 24 inequality 
constraints are satisfied.   
We next turn to the empirical analysis, which will test for complementarity by checking 
whether these constraints are accepted by our data on innovation. 
                                                 
5 We drop the subscript and the institutional endowment for convenience.    11  
   
 
4. Testing for Complementarity 
As we discussed above, one way to test for complementarity is to test whether the 
choice variables are correlated.  For instance, within the context of our simple example 
above, if the two countries are located at { } 11  and { } 01 , there is little evidence of 
complementarity.  By contrast, evidence of one country being at { } 11  and the other at 
{} 00  would be indicative of complementarity.  An alternative approach is to test for 
complementarity in innovation policy by directly testing whether the objective function 
is supermodular, i.e. testing whether the inequality constraints [2] are satisfied.  This is 
the approach followed in this paper, which we turn to after a brief description of the 
data.  
 
4.1 The CIS data 
In 1992, the statistical agency of the European Union - Eurostat - directed a coordinated 
effort to collect firm-level data on innovation in the EU member countries. The 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS 1) data were collected using a similar questionnaire 
and comparable sampling procedures. To date, there has been relatively little 
econometric analysis of this data set, but given the information it offers, it is ideally 
suited for tackling the research tasks described here. 
The data set comprises individual firm data on some general characteristics of the firm 
(main industry of affiliation, sales, employment, export sales), various innovation 
measures, numerous perceptions of factors hampering or fostering innovation, and some 
economic impact measures of innovation. We use the CIS 1 survey data from four 
                                                 
6 The remaining constraints are equalities.    12  
   
countries: Ireland, Denmark, Germany, and Italy.
7  The data are made publicly available 
at a micro-aggregated level, i.e. continuous variables are averaged over three 
observations of consecutive rank within an industry. Non-aggregated individual 
responses can be used for empirical studies at the Eurostat site in Luxemburg. However, 
the micro-aggregation procedures chosen by Eurostat allow us in principle to apply the 
full set of micro-econometric techniques even with the aggregated data. The possibility 
of a micro-aggregation bias in the presence of nonlinear estimation techniques is an 
interesting topic in itself, but we shall not pursue it here.
8 
In terms of our dependent variables we use two variables for equation [3] and [4] below. 
The innovation surveys provide an output measure of innovation, which is the share in 
sales of innovative products.  In addition, the survey also provides information on 
whether a firm innovates at all, which is the dependent variable in the probit equation 
[4]. 
Of particular importance is a survey question in which firms were asked to evaluate the 
importance of potential innovation obstacles. These obstacles can be categorized into 
four groups (see Appendix 2): factors relating to risk and finance, factors relating to 
knowledge-skill within the enterprise, factors measuring the knowledge-skill outside the 
enterprise, and finally regulation.  The complementarity between these potential 
impediments is the focus of this paper. 
Aggregating the obstacles in each group would be inconsistent with our assumption of 
obstacle-specific functions linking constraints to government actions.  Therefore we 
have decided to analyze four specific obstacles, one from each group: lack of 
appropriate sources of finance, lack of skilled personnel, lack of opportunities of 
cooperation with other firms and technological institutions, and legislation, norms, 
                                                 
7 France had no questions on innovation obstacles, Portugal and the Netherlands had missing values for 
some innovation obstacles, Greece and Norway had too few observations, and the Belgian survey was 
actually the result of three regional surveys and therefore not considered homogeneous enough. 
8 Mairesse and Mohnen (2001) compare the raw and the microaggregated CIS2 data for France on a 
model similar to the one used in this paper. They do not find any aggregation bias.    13  
   
regulations, standards, taxation (see Appendix 2)
9. The respondents answered these 
questions on a Likert scale (one to five).  
There may very well be a country specific response bias, which could, for instance, be 
due to differences across countries in survey methods or questionnaires.  In order to 
control our estimates for such country effects in responding to the questionnaire, we 
have transformed the responses into binary responses, according to whether or not the 
response to each question was above or below the average country response (for all 
obstacles and industries), which was 1.87 in Ireland, 2.04 in Denmark, 2.15 in Germany 
and 1.93 in Italy.  
The data have been cleaned for outliers, missing observations, and inconsistencies. In 
particular, we eliminated all enterprises with less than 20 employees, with missing 
industry affiliation, and with an R&D/sales ratio higher than 50%. We put to zero 
R&D/sales ratios positive but lower than 0.1%. As the Italian sample resulted from a 
census and not a survey, the Italian sample was ten times greater than the second largest 
country sample, Germany. We therefore took for Italy a random subsample (after 
cleaning) of 5% of all enterprises with 20 to 49 employees, 10% of all enterprises 
between 50 and 99 employees, 10% of all enterprises between 100 and 249 employees, 
and all enterprises with more than 250 employees. This sampling is consistent with the 
sampling frame adopted by the other countries. In the end we were left with 572 
observations in Denmark, 715 in Ireland, 1910 in Germany and 2254 in Italy. 
We divided total manufacturing into 11 sectors, whose description, abbreviation and 
related NACE codes are listed in Appendix 1. In defining the sectors we were guided by 
the industry aggregation Eurostat (1997) uses in presenting the descriptive statistics of 
the CIS 1 survey. 
 
                                                 
9 We have also experimented with alternative specific obstacles from each group. The basic results are the 
same.    14  
   
4.2 Complementarity Tests 
To test the inequality constraints implied by complementarity, we need consistent 
estimates of the effects of obstacles on innovation.  Recall from [1] that the innovation 
function depends on obstacles as well as other pre-determined industry and country 
specific effects  ij θ .   
In this spirit we specify the following innovation function,   
ij i j ij
l
lj l ij Z s I
k





      [ 3 ]  
where j is the country and i is the industry (note that [3] will be estimated with firm 
level data, and that we have suppressed the firm subscript).  
The innovation variable I will be the percentage in sales of innovative products.  In 
accordance with the previous section, we include a set of state dummy variables denoted 
by  lj s , which correspond to state l in country j. In particular, we define the 16 dummy 
variables by following the convention of binary algebra
10.  The coefficients on these 
state dummy variables ( li γ ) allow us to test for complementarity in innovation policies.   
In line with [1], we allow for industry and country specific pre-determined factors ( ij θ ) 
by including country fixed effects,  j µ , and industry fixed effects,  i δ .  
Finally, we also include a number of firm-level control variables related to innovative 
activities that are available in the CIS data set, which we denote by  ij Z  in [3].  Note that 
these variables are not explicitly mentioned in [1], for notational convenience.   
Specifically, we use size dummies as measured through employment, a dummy for 
whether the firm belongs to a group, the R&D per sales ratio, a dummy for continuous 
                                                 
10 In other words,  0 s  corresponds to state 0000,  1 s  to 0001, ….. ,  15 s  to 1111. We drop the i and j 
subscripts for convenience.     15  
   
R&D, and a dummy for whether the firm is engaged in cooperative R&D.  Summary 
statistics of all variables used in [3] are provided in Table 1.
 11   
Using specification [3] and the definition of the state dummies, we write the inequality 
constraints for supermodularity as a set of restrictions on the coefficients on the state 
variables
12.  Using [2] and [3], the four constraints that need to be satisfied for obstacles 
1 and 2 to be complementary can be compactly written as, 
  3 , 2 , 1 , 0          where ,    12 0 4 8 = + ≤ + + + + + s s s s s γ γ γ γ         (comp12) 
Similarly, the other complementarity conditions can be written as, 
  5 , 4 , 1 , 0          where ,    10 0 2 8 = + ≤ + + + + + s s s s s γ γ γ γ         (comp13) 
  6 , 4 , 2 , 0 s          where ,    9 0 1 8 = + ≤ + + + + + s s s s γ γ γ γ         (comp14) 
  9 , 8 , 1 , 0          where ,    6 0 2 4 = + ≤ + + + + + s s s s s γ γ γ γ         (comp23) 
  10 , 8 , 2 , 0          where ,    5 0 1 4 = + ≤ + + + + + s s s s s γ γ γ γ         (comp24) 
12 , 8 , 4 , 0          where ,    3 0 1 2 = + ≤ + + + + + s s s s s γ γ γ γ         (comp34) 
Note that complementarity over the entire set will involve all 24 constraints to jointly 
hold for a given industry.  Testing 24 joint inequality constraints is computationally 
very burdensome (see below).  Given that pairwise complementarity between any subset 
                                                 
11 As we have mentioned above, omitted variables may bias the estimates.  However, this does not 
automatically imply that complementarity will be inconsistently estimated. An example of this is as 
follows. Let  1 x  be “lack of appropriate sources of finance” and  2 x  be “lack of opportunities for 
cooperation”, which are variables that we include in our analysis.  Consider now a possible omitted 
variable such as firms’ willingness to “risk taking”.  When risk taking is positively correlated with  1 x , then 
the estimate of  1 β  is inconsistent.  By contrast,  3 β  is not inconsistently estimated, unless we also have 
that  0 ) , ( plim 2 1 ≠ ε x x , which implies that risk taking is higher whenever both the “lack of appropriate 
sources of finance” and the “lack of opportunities for cooperation” exist.  In other words, 
complementarity between two policies is inconsistently inferred when the omitted variable is correlated 
with the interaction.   
12 It is worth mentioning that the above specification [3] can also be equivalently written in terms of 
obstacle dummies instead of state dummies. In this case, intuitively, the conditions for complementarity 
concern interaction effects between obstacles.  Note that this is not equivalent to the cross-partials 
between those two obstacles, since the derivative w.r.t. a discrete variable is not defined.    16  
   
of obstacles implies supermodularity over the subset, we are able to proceed by testing 
each pair of obstacles separately. This implies the joint testing of four inequality 
constraints.  For completeness, it is worth emphasizing that the innovation function 
could be submodular, that is the obstacles could be substitutes.  In this case, the above 
inequality constraints would be analogous, however the inequalities would have the 
opposite signs.    
Assuming that we have consistent estimates of the  l γ ￿s from [3], we can test for super- 
and submodularity between any two obstacles.  In both tests we will specify as the null 
hypothesis that the constraints are met.  As should be clear from the above inequality 
constrains, the tests for sub- or supermodularity are joint, one-sided tests of the four 
constraints.  
We begin with a test for strict complementarity. Consider the hypothesis that the four 
constraints for obstacles 1 and 2 are complementary (i.e. the innovation function is 
supermodular)
13, that is,  
0    and    0    and    0   and    0 : 3 2 1 0 0 < < < < h h h h H   [Test 1 ￿ strict Supermodularity] 
0 or      0 or      0 or      0 : 3 2 1 0 1 ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ h h h h H   
where  3 , 2 , 1 , 0 ,   - 12 8 s 4 s 0 = − + + = + + + + s h s s s γ γ γ γ .  The test accepts H0 (strict complementarity of 
the two obstacles) whenever the constraints are jointly negative.  By contrast, rejection 
of the null hypothesis does not imply that the two obstacles are substitutes.  Note that H1 
includes an ￿or￿, which implies that some constraints may have mixed signs.  In this 
case, neither complementarity nor substitutability is present.  
Similarly, we can specify a test for strict substitutability. Consider the null hypothesis 
that the four constraints for obstacles 1 and 2 to be substitutes are met, that is 
0    and    0    and    0   and    0 : 3 2 1 0 0 > > > > h h h h H   [Test 1 ￿ strict Submodularity] 
0 or      0 or      0 or      0 : 3 2 1 0 1 ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ h h h h H   
                                                 
13 The specification of the tests for the other 5 complementarity relationships are analogous.    17  
   
The test accepts H0 whenever the constraints are jointly positive.  As before, rejection of 
the null hypothesis does not imply that the two obstacles are complements.   
To test this set of inequality conditions (4 for each pair of innovation policies) we apply 
the distance or Wald test, which minimizes the distance between  γ￿ S  and 
~
γ S , where γ￿is 
a consistent estimate of γ and 
~
γ is the closest to Sγ under H0.
14  We follow Kodde and 
Palm (1986) who have computed lower and upper bound critical values for this test. 
Values of the Wald test below the lower bound imply that the null hypothesis is 
accepted.  By contrast, values above the upper bound yield a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. Values in between the two bounds imply that the test is inconclusive.  
Before we report on our empirical test results, we must return to the issue of consistent 
estimation of [3]. Recall that our modularity tests are based on consistent estimates of 
the  l γ ￿s.  
 
4.3  Econometric Issues and Estimation 
An important consideration is to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the  l γ ￿s.  A 
potentially significant issue is that we observe a firm￿s innovation activity only if this 
firm in fact innovates.  Many firms in our sample do not innovate at all, i.e. we have 
that  0 = ij I , which may give rise to censoring.   
Besides the econometric problem of censoring, we may also be interested to test for 
complementarity in the likelihood that firms innovate.  As we mentioned above, there 
are potentially two separate effects obstacles may have on innovation activities: a 
change in the obstacles to innovation may have an impact on the probability of 
innovating as well as on the intensity of innovation.   
                                                 
14  In other words, γ ~  minimizes  ) ￿ ~ ( ’ ) ￿ cov( )’ ￿ ~ ( γ γ γ γ γ S S S S S S − − , s.t.   0 ~ ≤ γ S .    18  
   
In order to also test for complementarity in the probability of innovating (the intensity is 
tested through [3]) and to correct for censoring, we specify a probit model (suppressing 
firm subscripts again): 
ij j i ij
l
lj l ij Z s PI
k





     [4] 
where  ij PI  is the latent variable corresponding to the probability of innovating,  ij Z  are 
pre-determined variables (size and group dummies in this case), and  lj s  are the states of 
obstacle perception defined above.  Innovating firms have positive values for  ij PI , non-
innovating firms have negative values.  A firm is considered as innovative if it reports a 
positive share in sales of innovative products.
15  In addition, we allow for industry and 
country specific pre-determined factors by including country fixed effects,  j φ , and 
industry fixed effects,  i η .  
The error terms  ij ε and  ij ν are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance-covariance matrix Σ .
16 The constraints and hypothesis tests for 
complementarity in becoming an innovator are analogous to the previous section with 
the γl￿s replaced by the corresponding λl￿s. 
Consistent estimates of the parameters in [3] and [4] are obtained by maximum 
likelihood estimation of a generalized tobit.  In order to get initial values we estimated a 
probit equation for the probability to innovate and an ordinary least squares regression 
for the intensity of innovation, with the inverse Mill￿s ratio to correct for censoring
17.  
The Mill￿s ratio was significant, suggesting that censoring is a problem.  
 
                                                 
15 Few firms declare to be innovative in processes and not in products. By focusing on shares in sales of 
innovative products, we actually capture process innovations as well. 
16 Where for reasons of identification  2 12
2
2 22 11 , , 1 ρσ σ σ σ σ = = = .  
17The correlation coefficient between the two equations of the generalized tobit model was not significant. 
Nevertheless, we have decided to report the generalized tobit results (as opposed to estimating a simple 
probability to innovate and a separate equation for the intensity of innovation) as the former nests the 
latter.      19  
   
5. Empirical Results 
We begin by presenting descriptive evidence in the form of simple count statistics.  The 
idea is to infer something about complementarity by inspecting occurrences. For 
instance, if obstacle one occurs more often together with obstacle two, rather than 
separately, we may interpret this in favor of complementarity between the two 
obstacles. Table 2 reports the frequency of occurrences of the 16 states in the four 
countries, as well as in a sub-sample of innovating firms.   
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
As can be seen in Table 2, it is clear that the most frequent responses are the two 
extremes - zero everywhere and one everywhere - as well as lack of appropriate sources 
of finance and zero for the other obstacles.  It appears that the data contain some 
evidence in favor of complementarity.  In terms of pairwise complementarity, there are 
a large number of possible counts to consider.  For example, obstacle 3 (external 
knowledge) and obstacle 4 (regulation) appear complementary: the occurrence of (0000) 
plus (0011) is more frequent than (0001) plus (0010).  In addition, (1111) plus (1100) 
occurs more often than (1101) plus (1110). The remaining two constraints for obstacles 
3 and 4 are also met.  Note that this holds for both data sets, i.e. ALL FIRMS (top of 
Table 2) as well as INNOVATORS (bottom of Table 2).  We therefore have some 
descriptive evidence in favor of pairwise complementarity of obstacles 3 and 4.   
Checking all the other constraints for all other obstacle pairs is tedious, yet it appears 
that there is considerable descriptive evidence in favor of complementarity for other 
obstacle pairs as well. Nevertheless, concluding from this that the innovation function is 
supermodular is premature. Count statistics can only be considered suggestive evidence 
of complementarity, since they do not control for any other factors.  We now turn to a 
more systematic approach. 
5.2  Econometric Evidence 
Consistent estimates of the parameters in [3] (i.e. intensity of innovation) and [4] (i.e. 
propensity to innovate) are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation of a generalized    20  
   
tobit. Table 3 reports the tobit estimates.  As can be seen, the probability to innovate 
depends on firm size (as measured by number of employees) with large firms (over 
1000 employees) having the highest likelihood of being an innovator.  Given data 
restrictions, we are able to include only one other control variable into the propensity 
equation, namely whether the firm is part of a conglomerate group. As can be seen we 
find that the firms that are part of a group are significantly more likely to be an 
innovator.  As far as the intensity of innovation is concerned, we find again that size 
matters. However, the estimates in Table 3 suggest that smaller firms have a higher 
intensity of innovation.  There are also a number of other control variables that are 
significant. In particular, whether a firm did R&D cooperatively as well as the 
R&D/sales ratio had a significant and positive impact on the intensity of innovation.   
Turning to the obstacles, we find that several obstacle states in the propensity equation 
are not significant, while the intensity of innovation equation displays a larger number 
of significant states (see Table 3 again).  At this point, it is important to emphasize that 
the individual significance and signs of the coefficients on the obstacles do not directly 
reveal whether the innovation function is complementary or substitutable for two 
reasons.  First, complementarity involves testing linear restrictions of several 
coefficients, like  0   - 12 8 4 0 < − + + γ γ γ γ .  Second, complementarity requires testing the joint 
distribution of several of these linear restrictions.  For both reasons, it is possible that all 
coefficients are statistically insignificant, even though the joint hypothesis for 
supermodularity is accepted.   
Consistent with the view that obstacles to innovation are perceived highest when a firm 
is in fact innovating, we find that when firms report no obstacles (state 0000) the 
propensity to innovate is lowest (see Table 3). This suggests an endogeneity problem, as 
there may be reverse causality from innovation activities to the reported obstacles by the 
firms.  By contrast, the coefficient associated with state 0000 in the intensity equation is 
the largest coefficient of any state (see Table 3 again), suggesting no reverse causality.  
In other words, obstacles are associated with lower levels of innovation.     21  
   
To partially investigate the reverse causality issue, we have estimated a simultaneous 
system, where in addition to [3], we also estimate a second equation that allows for the 
states to depend on innovation. When we estimate by 2SLS the intensity of innovation, 
we find that reverse causality is not statistically significant, i.e. we find no significant 
impact of innovation intensity on any of the states (at the 5% level).
18 However, many 
of the instruments used in the 2SLS are likely to be endogenous. Obtaining better 
instruments is difficult in this context. Since we only have micro-aggregated data, we 
cannot merge the firm data in our sample with observations on the same firms from 
other data sets and are therefore constrained in the choice of instruments to variables 
collected in the same innovation surveys. If we could merge the innovation surveys with 
data on production, organizational change,  or matched employers-employees surveys, 
other instruments could be used such as the capital intensity of the firm, the educational 
background of the CEO, the skill level of the managers, the financial structure of the 
firm, the legal status, or the type of ownership. Alternatively, with the appearance of 
new waves of innovation surveys it will become possible to have a longitudinal data set 
and to use lagged variables as instruments. 
Using the estimated  l γ￿  and  l λ ￿ , we now turn to the complementarity and substitutability 
tests described above for both the probability of becoming an innovator (through  l λ ￿ ) as 
well as the intensity of innovation (through  l γ￿ ).  Table 4 presents the Wald statistic for 
both the super- and sub-modularity tests. The upper bound critical value at a 10% 
significance level is 7.094, which implies that the null hypothesis is definitely rejected 
when the Wald statistic is above 7.094.  The lower bound critical value is 1.642, which 
implies that the null hypothesis is definitely accepted for values below this level. The 
test is inconclusive for values in between the two bounds. 
As can be seen in Table 4 the results regarding the supermodularity of the innovation 
function depends on whether one is concerned with the propensity or the intensity to 
                                                 
18 Since we do not have enough information on firms that do not innovate (only innovators need to fill out 
the whole questionnaire), we cannot estimate the simultaneous system for the propensity equation 
(equation [4]) due to lack of instruments. In this sense, our results below regarding the propensity of 
innovation have to qualified.     22  
   
innovate.  In particular, the probability of becoming an innovator displays considerable 
substitutability in obstacles. For instance, the null hypothesis that obstacles 2 (￿internal 
human capital￿) and obstacle 3 (￿external human capital￿) are substitutable is accepted 
by our test (Wald statistic of 0.353).  In other words, the lack of skilled personnel is less 
of a problem, when there is also a lack of external human capital.  More generally, 
obstacles 2 (￿internal human capital￿), obstacle 3 (￿external human capital￿), and 
obstacle 4 (￿regulation￿) are all jointly substitutable factors in determining whether a 
firm is innovative or not (the Wald statistic is below 1 for all these pairs, see Table 4).  
This indicates that the probability of innovating is submodular in obstacles 2, 3 and 4. 
Finally, there is also substitutability between obstacles 1 (￿lack of finance￿) and 
obstacle 3 (￿external human capital￿).   
Overall, the results regarding the probability to innovate suggest that there is 
considerable substitutability across most (but not all!) obstacles.  This finding is further 
supported by the results of the supermodularity test, which soundly rejects 
complementarity for 4 obstacle pairs. In the two cases where we cannot accept a 
relationship of substitutability between pairs of obstacles (the test being inconclusive), 
we can definitely reject complementarity.  
By contrast, the results regarding the intensity of innovating suggest a significant 
complementarity over several obstacles.  In particular, as can be seen in Table 4, 
obstacle 1 (￿lack of finance￿) is complementary with all other obstacles (the highest 
Wald statistic of any obstacle pair is 1.53).  In other words, insufficient finance lowers 
the intensity of innovation by more whenever there is insufficient internal human 
capital, or there is lack of cooperation with other firms or when regulatory obstacles 
exist.  A relationship of substitutability shows up between obstacles 2-3 (￿lack of skilled 
personnel￿ and ￿lack of opportunity to cooperate￿) and 3-4 (￿lack of opportunity to 
cooperate￿ and ￿regulations￿). Moreover, in three out of six cases, the results of the 
complementarity test get reinforced by the results of the Wald test for submodularity. 
Obstacle pairs 1-2 and 1-3 are accepted as complements and rejected as substitutes,    23  
   
whereas obstacles 3 and 4 are accepted as substitutes and rejected as complements. In 
the other three cases, one of the two tests is inconclusive. 
The previous findings indicate that the evidence regarding the existence of 
complementarity in obstacles depends on the phase of innovation  (propensity or 
intensity) as well as the particular obstacle pair.  While the evidence regarding the 
propensity to innovate points towards a number of substitutable relationships, 
complementarity comes out strongly for a number of obstacles as far as the intensity of 
innovation is concerned.   
While some obstacle pairs ￿ such as 2-3, 3-4 ￿ are substitutable across both dimensions 
of innovation, others ￿ such as 1-3 ￿ display strong evidence of substitutability in the 
propensity to innovate, and at the same time significant complementarity in the intensity 
of innovation. This points towards a possible difficulty in designing optimal policies for 
innovation, since the impact may pan out very differently across the two innovation 
phases.  Lack of access to finance is complementary to all other obstacles for the 
intensity of innovation, while complementarity is rejected for the propensity to become 
an innovator.  
What implications do complementarities (substitutabilities) in innovation obstacles have 
for innovation policy. If obstacles are substitutes, the presence of one obstacle relieves 
the pressure from the other one. In that case removing one obstacle will exacerbate the 
other one. Both should be removed jointly. If obstacles are complements, however, the 
two obstacles reinforce each other. Removing one will attenuate the other one. There 
might be less reasons to remove both at the same time. Submodularity 
(supermodularity) in innovation obstacles means supermodularity (submodularity) in 
innovation policies.  
Subject to the endogeneity issue raised above our results lead to the following 
preliminary policy recommendations. When it comes to turn non-innovators into 
innovators, it is important to remove a bunch of obstacles at the same time. 
Governments should adopt a mix of policies, for instance easing access to finance and    24  
   
allowing firms to cooperate with other firms and technological institutions, or 
increasing the amount of skilled personnel and reducing the regulatory burden. When it 
comes to increasing the amount of innovation, one or the other policy will do: easing 
access to finance, making more skilled labor available, or allowing for more 
collaborations. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper develops a framework for testing complementarity in innovation policies 
based on estimating the objective function directly.  We specify and estimate an 
innovation function using European firm data from the first Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS1) and test the implied inequality conditions for supermodularity. 
Innovation obstacles serve as negative proxies of innovation policies. We investigate 
two phases of the innovation process: the decision to innovate or not, and the intensity 
of innovation, conditional that a firm does any innovation at all.   
Our results are preliminary insofar that they are based on cross-sectional evidence 
which significantly reduces our ability to fully address the endogeneity of perceived 
obstacles to innovation. With this qualification we find that the evidence regarding the 
existence of complementarity in innovation policies depends on the phase of innovation  
(propensity or intensity) as well as the particular  pair of economic policies.  While the 
evidence regarding the propensity to innovate points towards a number of substitutable 
relationships in innovation policy, substitutability among policies seems more often the 
norm as far as the intensity of innovation is concerned.  This indicates that these two 
phases of innovation, i.e. the probability of becoming an innovator and the intensity of 
innovation, are subject to different constraints.   
Moreover, some obstacle pairs are substitutable in the propensity to innovate, while 
complements in the intensity of innovation. This points towards a possible difficulty in 
designing optimal policies for innovation, since the impact may pan out very differently 
across innovation phases.  For example, the ￿lack of finance￿ and the ￿lack of    25  
   
opportunity to cooperate￿ are complements for the intensity to innovate, but 
substitutable for the propensity to become an innovator, which implies that policies 
should be put in place to remove both obstacles in order to make firms innovative, but 
only one policy is needed to make them more innovative.  26 
 
Table 1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
CIS I, micro-aggregated data, 1992 (sample mean)  
 
Variable Mean 
Percentage of innovators  61.1 
% in sales of innovative 
products for innovators 
27.6 
% of enterprises with 20-49 
employees 
26.2 
% of enterprises with 50-99 
employees 
18.8 
% of enterprises with 100-249 
employees 
17.3 
% of enterprises with 250-499 
employees 
19.5 
% of enterprises with 500-999 
employees 
9.6 
% of enterprises with >999 
employees 
8.7 
% of enterprises that are part of a 
group 
47.2 
Average number of employees  654.3 
% of enterprises doing R&D among 
innovators 
55.2 
% of innovators doing R&D 
continuously 
43.4 
% of innovators doing 
cooperative R&D 
21.1 
Average R&D/sales ratio for 
innovators 
3.1 





OBSTACLE OCCURRENCES IN %  
(SEE APPENDIX 2 FOR OBSTACLE DEFINITIONS) 
 
Obstacle  State  0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110  1111 
ALL FIRMS  23.5  3.1 1.3 1.0 4.0 2.7  1.8  2.3 11.8 5.6  2.4  3.8 6.0 7.7 4.8 18.3 






MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE GENERALIZED TOBIT MODEL 
 
 






50-99 employees  0.24 (.057)  -0.11 (.109) 
100-249 employees  0.41 (.062)  -0.21 (.114) 
250-499 employees  0.68 (.064)  -0.55 (.124) 
500-999 employees  0.81 (.082)  -0.66 (.143) 
over 1000 employees  0.90 (.094)  -0.58 (.151) 
    
Being part of a group  0.30 (.046)  -0.10 (.078) 
R&D/sales  -x- 0.16  (.029) 
Doing R&D on a continuous basis  -x- 0.03  (.076) 
Doing cooperative R&D  -x- 0.24  (.078) 
    
States    
0000  -0.49 (.087)  0.76 (.230) 
0001  0.13 (.141)  0.20 (.244) 
0010  0.13 (.200)  0.12 (.320) 
0011  0.35 (.234)  0.20 (.341) 
0100  0.07 (.127)  0.33 (.243) 
0101  0.02 (.148)  0.73 (.259) 
0110  0.14 (.172)  0.40 (.287) 
0111  -0.07 (.151)  0.44 (.276) 
1000  0.08 (.097)  0.61 (.210) 
1001  0.12 (.113)  0.43 (.222) 
1010  -0.01 (.151)  0.45 (.272) 
1011  0.23 (.129)  0.40 (.239) 
1100  0.10 (.113)  0.43 (.227) 
1101  0.28 (.106)  0.50 (.207) 
1110  0.12 (.118)  0.35 (.234) 
1111  0.14 (.093)  0.44 (.204) 
Standard error  1 1.83  (.03) 
Percentage of correct predictions  0.45 -x- 
Squared corr (obsv￿d and pred￿d values) -x- 0.31 
Estimated ρ  -0.13 (0.32) 
Standard errors in parentheses under estimated coefficients. There are also country and 
industry dummies in both equations. A prediction is considered to be correct when an 
innovator gets a prediction above the average observed propensity to innovate. 
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COMPLEMENTARITY/SUBSTITUTABILITY TETS IN INNOVATION POLICY 
Wald test of inequality restrictions based on generalized Tobit estimates 




  Probability to innovate    Intensity of innovation 
Obstacle 
Pairs 
1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4    1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4  3-4 
Supermodularity Test 
 
  13.443 7.908 10.998 6.752 11.952 3.028   0.00  0.00  1.529 3.341 3.730  14.090 
Submodularity Test 
 
  2.690 0.000 2.215 0.353 0.772 0.871   18.653 9.984  5.215 0.335  8.156  0.403 
Obstacle definitions: 1= Lack of appropriate sources of finance, 2= Lack of skilled personnel, 3= Lack of 
opportunities for cooperation with other firms and technological institutions, 4= Legislation, norms, regulations, 
standards, taxation. 
* see Kodde and Palm (1986) 
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Industry  NACE code  Description of Industry 
 
FOOD   15-16    food, beverages and tobacco 
TEXTILE  17-19    textiles, wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur,  
tannings, and dressing of leather, luggage, handbags, saddlery, 
harness and footwear 
WOOD  20-22    wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture,  
straw and plaiting materials, pulp, paper, and paper products, 
publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media 
CHEM   23-24    refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, chemicals and 
chemical products 
PLASTIC  25    rubber and plastic products 
NON-MET  26    other non-metallic mineral products 
METAL  27-28    basic metals, fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
M&E   29   machinery  and  equipment 
ELEC    30-33    office machinery and computers, electrical machinery and  
apparatus, radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus, medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks. 
VEHIC  34-35    motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers, and other transport 
equipment 
NEC     36   furniture 
    30 







        
Category 1: Risk and finance 
•  Excessive perceived risk 
•  Lack of appropriate sources of finance         => Obstacle 1 
•  Innovation costs too high 
•  Pay-off period of innovation too long 
 
Category 2: Knowledge-skill within enterprise 
•  Enterprises￿s innovation potential too small 
•  Lack of skilled personnel             => Obstacle 2 
•  Lack of information on technologies 
•  Lack of information on markets 
•  Innovation costs hard to control 
•  Resistance of change in the enterprise 
 
Category 3: Knowledge-skill outside the enterprise 
•  Deficiencies in the availability of external technical services 
•  Lack of opportunities for cooperation with other firms and  
technological  institutions         =>  Obstacle  3 
•  Lack of technological opportunities 
•  No need to innovate due to earlier innovations 
 
Category 4: Regulations 
•  Innovation too easy to copy 
•  Legislation, norms, regulations, standards, taxation     => Obstacle 4 
•  Lack of customer responsiveness to new products and processes 
•  Uncertainty in timing of innovation 
 
                                                 
* The obstacles used in the analysis of this paper are in bold.    31 
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